Editors by Editors,
March, x939
University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Monthly, November to June, by the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Copyright 1939, by the University of Pennsylvania.
$4.50 PER ANNUM
BOARD
THOMAS P. GLASSMOYER, Editor-in-
Chief
PHILIP A. BREGY, Case Editor
LEON S. FORMAN, Secretary
THOMAS J. BEDDOW
ROBERT J. BRECKER
MYRTILE FRANK, JR.
ARNOLD R. GINSBURG
CARL E. HEILMAN
WALTER E. KNECHT, Jl
H. ALLEN LOCHNER
JOHN C. PHILLIPS
ROBERT C. PORTER
WILLIAM H. RIVOIR, JR.
ROBERT H. SHERTZ
W. FRAZIER SCOTT
CONRAD A. WICKHAM, JR.
ROY WILKINSON, JR.
FOREIGN, $5.00 CURRENT COPIES, 75 CENTS
OF EDITORS
SHERWIN T. McDOWELL, Managing
Editor
ALEXANDER COHEN, Legislation and
Note Editor
HOWARD W. TAYLOR, JR., Book
Review Editor
]E FRANCIS DBLONE
G. FRED DiBONA
RICHARD M. DICKE
SIDNEY W. FPRICK
JOSEPH K. GILLIGAN
ANDREW HOURIGAN, JR.
WILLIAM B. MARSHALL
THOMAS A. O'BOYLE
ANDERSON PAGE
MITCHELL E. PANZER
THEODORE 0. ROGERS
EDWIN P. ROME
ROBERT W. SAYRE
MILTON H. SHAPIRO
LEWIS WEINSTOCK
Correspondence concerned with editorial matters should be directed to the EmToa-
IN-CHn= ; address business inquiries to the SECaRARY.
LEGISLATION
Commingled Investment by Corporate Fiduciaries in
Pennsylvania
I. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMINGLED INVESTMENT
The problem of handling the funds of small trust estates as well as
small cash balances of the larger trusts has become one of real concern to
(577)
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the corporate trustee during the last decade and a half.1 The amount of
funds handled by trust companies and banks engaged in the trust business
has increased rapidly during this period,2 and statistics indicate that a large
part of these funds consist of small trust accounts 3 which can only be
invested separately at great expense to the trust company and without ob-
taining the rate of return which ordinarily accrues to the larger trust. In
addition, greater risk is involved to the small trust because of the inability
to obtain proper diversification of investment. Thus, in order to keep the
business of the small account, it has become necessary for the trust com-
panies to find some medium which will meet the three fundamental requi-
sites of good investment policy: maximum return, stability of income, and
security of principal. It was felt that by commingling the funds of various
small trust accounts for investment, such results could be obtained. Such
a method would assure continuity of investment-thus enabling both
stability of income and a maximum rate of return, provide a greater degree
of security by affording opportunity for diversification, and, at the same
time, from the administrative and bookkeeping standpoint, provide an eco-
nomical method of investment for the corporate trustee.
Although commingling of funds for investment is not a new idea in
the field of trust administration,4 it was not until 1925 that the practice
I. Bogue, Common Trust Fund Legislation (1938) 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 430;
Barclay, Commingled Funds Offer Broader Scope for Trust Service (931) 53 TRUST
Cos. 615; Knowles, Pooling of Mortgages for Trust Investment (928) 46 id. 631;
Miller, Allocation of Small Trust Balances to Mortgages and Bonds (93o) 50 id. 581;
Whittlesey, Commingled Fund Recommended as Solution of Several Major Trust
Problems (1934) 58 id. 321; Legis. (937) 37 COL. L. REV. 1384; Note (1936) 45
YALE L. J. 857. Some trust companies, in order to expand their scope of business,
adopted "uniform trust plans". See New Development in Uniform Trust Plan An-
nounced by City Bank Farmers Trust (1929) 49 TRUST Cos. 491.
2. Riddle, Trust Investments: Their Extent and Some Related Economic Prob-
lems (1938) 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 339, 340-342. It is there stated that trust insti-
tutions administer over five billion dollars of personal trust property in Pennsylvania.
Id. at 342. This is an increase of approximately a billion and a half since x927. See
Annual Report of Secretary of Banking of Pennsylvania (1928) 46 TRUST COS. 287.
3. As to what is a small trust see Ward, Trust Service for Persons of Sall
Means (1936) 62 TRUsT Cos. 609, 61o; Stephenson, Trends in the Trust Field (1936)
63 id. 7, 9. Apparently a small trust runs anywhere from $IO,OOO to $35,000. Seem-
ingly, the average trust account in cities under 250,ooo amounts to about $27,000; in
the larger cities, although there are no definite figures, about 3o per cent. of the ac-
counts of a number of the larger trust concerns are apparently of this size. See Horn,
Economies Through the Common Trust Fund (938) 67 id. 54, 55.
4. As early as 1888 in England, trustees attempted investment in contributory
mortgages in which interests were held by other trust estates having different fiduci-
aries. This was not sanctioned on the grounds that the trustee was unable to retain
complete control over the investment. Webb v. Jonas, 39 Ch. D. 66o (1888). Accord:
Dive v. Roebuck, [19o9] 1 Ch. 328. However, a similar practice was recognized in
New York as a practical method of investment in 1885. Barry v. Lambert, 98 N. Y.
300 (1885). The combining of funds of estates held by the same fiduciary was ap-
parently in vogue in New Zealand in 1891 [MacDonald, Operating a Common Fund
for Trust Investments (1928) 46 TRUST Cos. 494] and in Massachusetts in 1892. See
Springfield Safe Dep. & Trust Co. v. First Unitarian SoC., 200 N. E. 541, 544 (Mass.
1936). It was quesfioned in New York, however, in 1916 on the grounds that the
trustee was violating the common-law principle against taking title to trust property in
its own name. Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916).
This decision led to the enactment in New York of legislation authorizing mortgage
participation by corporate trustees. N. Y. Laws 1917, c. 385, repealed by N. Y. Laws
1937, c. 619, § I, and incorporated in N. Y. BANKING LAW § ioo-b (2), which apparently
no longer permits the practice. However, the investment of commingled funds in mort-
gage pools would seem to be allowed under the New York common trust fund statute.
See id. §§ IOO-C (3) and 239 (6).
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was authorized in Pennsylvania,5 and then with respect to the establish-
ment of mortgage pools, the statute thereafter being construed to permit
the taking of title by the corporate fiduciary in its individual capacity even
in the case of participations in a single mortgage." After a few more years
of labor, a movement to extend the privilege of commingling to other than
mortgage investments gave birth in Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions
to legislation authorizing securities pools, or what today is known in the
trust investment world as the "common trust fund".7
With the collapse of the mortgage-loan market during the recent de-
pression, the mortgage pool and single mortgage participation types of
investment became greatly discredited. This was caused principally by a
shrinkage in realty values and a dearth of restrictions in the first legisla-
tion authorizing such methods of investment." An outstanding example
was the practice engaged in by some trust companies, but particularly by
title insurance and mortgage guaranty companies, of issuing participation
certificates in large mortgages to the public and guaranteeing full payment
of principal and interest. When the mortgagors commenced to default
en masse and real estate values began to decline, many guarantors were
unable to make good on their obligations.' This did not weaken the sound-
ness of the idea, however, and it was felt that, with proper legislative
restrictions, it could be continued. Consequently, the most recent legis-
lation on commingling in Pennsylvania has been in the form of restrictive
amendments to the earlier authorization of mortgage participation by cor-
porate fiduciaries. 10
5. Pa. Laws 1925, 152. In the same year individual trustees were given authority
to invest in trust certificates issued by trust companies and backed by legal invest-
ments. PA. STAT. Aimx. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 8O (old legal list); Kauffman v.
Hiestand, 131 Pa. Super. 219, 200 Atl. 252 (1938). This provision is no longer included
in the legal list, however, no doubt because it amounted to a delegation by the indi-
vidual trustee of his power to invest. See Simpson, Participation Certificates Permit-
ting Substitutions of Securities as Legal Investments for Trust Funds (1930) 7 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 950, 956.
6. Guthrie's Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 182 Atl. 248 (1936) ; Dillon's Estate, 324 Pa. 252,
188 AUt. 134 (1936).
7. Pa. Laws 1933, 624, § 11o9, at p. 7o6; Del. Laws 1935, c. 23o; Onio CODE Axx.
(Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934) § 71o-164; Vt. Laws 1933, § 5445. See infra note IO.
8. Bailey and Rice, The Duties of a Trustee with Respect to Defaulted Mortgage
Investments (1935) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 157; Gouley, Real Estate Mortgage Bonds as
Trust Investments (1935) 83 id. 953; Mortgage Pool Legislation Report (1935) 61
TRUST Cos. 633, 634.
9. For illustrative Pennsylvania cases where trust companies engaged in such prac-
tices see In re Commercial Trust Co., 36 Dauphin Co. 393 (Pa. C. P. 1933) ; Werner
v. Gordon, 38 Dauphin Co. 8 (Pa. C. P. 1934). See also cases cited in Note (1936)
45 YALE L. J. 857, 859, n. 7. For examples of cases involving guaranty companies see
id. n. 8. See also Note (1934) 34 COL. L. R-v. 663. Cf. Roberts's Trust Estate, 316
Pa. 545, 175 Atl. 869 (1934); Osterling v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 320 Pa. 67, 181
Atl. 769 (935) ; In re Manayunk Trust Co., No. 2, 21 D. & C. 405 (Pa. C. P. 1934).
The present study will not touch upon the title insurance or mortgage guarantee sit-
uation, but only with commingled investment by corporate fiduciaries.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 7, § 819-IIOg to 11o9.6. Hereafter,
all references made to the present statute [which constitutes §§ 11o9-11o9.6 of the Penn-
sylvania Banking Code, but is set down in subdivision form under § 819 of PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 71 will be made in the following form: §11o9, § IIO9.3B,
or whatever section may be under discussion.
Other states at this time (1937) passed common fund statutes: Ind. Acts 1937, c.
23, § 20; Minn. Laws 1937, c. 174; N. Y. BANKING LAW § I00-c. For two recent dis-
cussions on common fund legislation in general see Bogue, supra note i; Note (1937)
37 COL. L. REv. 1384.
It should be noted at the outset that the instant legislation deals only with cor-
porate fiduciaries. A rather nebulous provision of the legal list, PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
58o UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
With this in mind, it is the purpose of this article to present a study of
the several forms of commingled investment in the light of the existing
statute and discuss its possible effects. Since all of the decisional law on
the subject has been in the field of mortgage investment, conclusions with
respect to the possible construction of the common fund portion of the
statute must necessarily be conjectural. However, in view of their simi-
larity, it seems safe to say that in many instances the same legal principles
will be applicable.
II. TYPES OF COMMINGLED INVESTMENT
There are three possible methods of maintaining commingled invest-
ments." ' In all of them each participant owns a fractional undivided inter-
est in the asset or assets thereof,12 the funds of the participants being
mingled by the common trustee for the benefit of all in proportion to the
extent of their interests. Investments, of course, must not exceed the
authority of any one of the separate trust instruments.
According to the pool plan, certificates are issued to the participants
indicating the extent of their equity and the estates participating, a registry
being kept of the certificates. By the trust plan, in addition to the issuance
of certificates, a declaration of trust is executed under which the commingled
fund is held in trust for the benefit of the various participants, such declara-
tion, where the investment is merely in a single mortgage, being filed with
the mortgage papers.' 3 Since the separate declaration of trust gives the
common trustee no more powers than he receives from the separate instru-
ments, it is difficult to discern any advantage over the pool plan. The com-
mon difficulty in both of these methods is that after a few years the certifi-
cates multiply too rapidly, and the system becomes burdensome and less
flexible.' 4 As a result, the trust companies have resorted to the practice
of merely recording on their books the estates participating and the extent
of their respective interests,' 5 a method which is now permitted by the
present statute.16 The third method suggested is to incorporate the fund,
issuing shares to the participants and distributing the income in the form
of dividends. Two obstacles arise here, one in the form of taxation as a
corporation,' 7 the other in the fact that corporate stocks are not within the
confines of legal investments for fiduciaries.' 8
It should be noted at the outset, however, that there is an important
factual difference between the common fund type of investment and the
various types of mortgage investment. The general conception of the com-
mon trust fund is a securities pool which by its very nature anticipates
withdrawals from and additions to the fund on short notice. When a
don, Supp. 1938) tit. 20, § 8ol, sub. (7), seems to extend the privilege of commingling
to individual trustees. If such is the construction intended, it opens to individuals the
administration of a complicated method of investment which, because of its nature,
should only be attempted by corporate trustees equipped with the necessary facilities to
do so.
1i. Peter, Some Problems Affecting Various Types of Commingled Trust Funds
(1931) 53 TRuST Cos. 325; Smith, Commingled Trust Funds as a New Advance in
Fiduciary Service (1932) 54 id. 593.
i. §§ ino9A, iio9.iA, 1109.3 A .
13. In re Manayunk Trust Co., No. 2, 21 D. & C. 405 (Pa. C. P. 1934) ; Knowles,
loc. cit. supra note i.
14. Knowles, loc. cit. supra note i.
15. Ibid.
I6. §§ IiogB, iiog.iB, 1109.3A.
17. Peter, loc. cit. supra note ii.
18. PA. STAT. Axx. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 2o, § 8oi.
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participation is added or withdrawn, the fund is increased or decreased in
accordance with the amount of cash that comes in or goes out.1-  Such is
only possible where a high degree of liquidity attaches to the securities in
the pool. The ideal fund of this type, therefore, from the viewpoint of
the corporate fiduciary, involves investments for the most part (around 6o
per cent.) in securities which can be readily marketed and easily liquidated,
such as active governments and municipals, corporate bonds, and securities
listed on the stock exchange.20  It also contains a liberal amount of ready
cash on hand. Such a type of investment involves a distinct departure
from the usual procedure of investing fiduciary funds in real estate mort-
gages and government bonds, and in many trust companies requires a
separate department to investigate and appraise their value.21 Appraisal is
based upon the earning capacity of the institution issuing the security, and
purchase depends upon whether or not such earning capacity will be suffi-
ciently productive to pay off the obligation at maturity. A pool of this
nature will contain but few mortgages, if any.
On the other hand, investments in mortgages involve long-term obliga-
tions which by nature cannot readily be turned into cash in and of them-
selves, and which, since the depression, have not proved so readily market-
able.22 The prospective sale-value of the real estate at the time the mort-
gage is given is the basis of its stability, local land values in the vicinity
(as distinguished from "earning capacity" in the valuation of other than
real securities) forming the basis of its appraisal.
There are essentially two types of commingled investment in mort-
gages. "Participation mortgages" involve the issuance of a single bond
against the mortgage, both of which are held by the corporate trustee.
28
The mortgage is carried by the trust company either in its individual
capacity or as trustee.2 4 Originally, certificates were issued against it which
in some instances were freely transferable among public investors. 25  Under
the present statute certificates cannot be issued by a trust company for
ig. Ward, supra note 3, at 612; Ward, Practical Problems in Operation (1938) 66
TRUST Cos. 213, 215; Wyman, Investment Considerations (x936) 63 id. 445.
20. Ibid. The Pennsylvania legal list does not authorize investment in stock ex-
change securities. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 20, § 8oi. See infra p. 587.
21. Wingfield, Use of a Common Trust Fund (1938) 66 TRusT Cos. 713, 715.
22. Mortgage Pool Legislation Report, supra note 8, at 634. It is felt by some
that a mortgage by nature is not meant to be marketable and should not fluctuate in
value as do readily salable securities-that stability, and not liquidity is the desideratum
of such an investment. See Fraser's Estate, ISo Misc. 43, 49, 268 N. Y. Supp. 477, 484
(1933). However, it would seem that fluctuation in the sale-value of a mortgage itself
is immaterial except insofar as it reflects the value of the realty upon which it is given.
Mortgages apparently were readily marketable before the depression, lack of market-
ability thereafter being caused by the freezing of the mortgage market. See Maginnes,
Mortgage Participation Interests in Trust Portfolios (1936) 62 TRUST Cos. g.
23. 3 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 676; Knowles, loc. cit. supra note I.
A "divided" mortgage is one issued to a corporate trustee for the benefit of a number
of bondholders to whom bonds are issued on the mortgage. Each bondholder owns
a separate equitable interest in the security, and upon default may request the trustee
to foreclose his equity. Since this type is not within the scope of the present statute, no
further reference will be made to it. As illustrative thereof see Gibson's Estate, 312 Pa.
359, 167 Atl. 282 (1933) ; Brooke's Estate, 321 Pa. 529, 184 Atl. 54 (1936).
24. This depends upon whether the particular jurisdiction permits title to be taken
in the corporate capacity. For a discussion of this point see infra p. 5go.
25. For example: Kauffman v. Hiestand, 131 Pa. Super. 219, 200 Ati. 252 (1938),
where it was held legal. See also Werner v. Gordon, 38 Dauphin Co. 8 (Pa. C. P.
1934) ; Reichert v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 262 Mich. 123, 247 N. W. 128 (1933) ;
Pridmore v. Steneck, 12o N. J. Eq. 567, 186 AtI. 513 (1936) ; Ulmer v. Fulton, 129
Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935) ; Knowles, loc. cit. supra note I.
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public investment, 26 and transferability is permitted, with one exception,
only for purposes of facilitating distribution.27  In the operation of "mort-
gage pools" the ordinary procedure is for the trust company to invest in
the proper mortgages through its banking department, and later transfer
certain of these within the department to a "mortgage pool account".
Thereafter, by declaration of trust, the banking department will assign all
right, title and interest to the trust department "as trustee", and the latter
will record upon its books the various estates having interests therein.28 As
in the case of the single mortgage participation, certificates were originally
issued to participants which were often freely transferable 29 and remained
outstanding until the liquidation of the pool. Thus no expansion or con-
traction took place during its existence such as occurs in the case of the
common trust fund as generally conceived. 0 Certificates are no longer
mandatory, however, and if issued, are restricted with respect to trans-
ferability.2 1
III. ESTABLIS11MENT UNDER THE STATUTE
Creation of Commingled Funds
The Pennsylvania statute authorizes the creation of securities pools
consisting of securities purchased solely with funds of estates held by it as
fiduciary. 2  It also authorizes the creation of undivided interests in any
single bond secured by mortgage or any single security, such interests to
be apportioned among the estates of which it is fiduciary.32 Finally it per-
mits the creation of one or more mortgage investment funds, restricting
investment therein to funds which it holds as fiduciary. 4 In all three types
of investments, interests are not permitted to be transferred to any cor-
poration or person, but shall be held solely by the trust company as fidu-
ciary, and the equitable interests therein shall be owned solely by estates
of which the company is fiduciary.3 5 This portion of the statute gives rise
to several problems.
(i) Trust Company's Interest: It is apparent in each situation that
the statute, in restricting investment to fiduciary funds, is intended to
prevent the maintenance of an interest by the trust company in its indi-
vidual capacity. This would prevent the practice prevailing in the man-
agement of mortgage pools, prior to the act, of maintaining a so-called
"float" or "equity" in that balance of a fund not held by trust estates.386
This is in accord with the common-law duty of loyalty that the trustee
administer the property solely in the interest of the beneficiary and refrain
26. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 7, § 819-1013. See inlfra p. 583.
27. §§ iio9A, iiog.iA, 1109.3B.
28. Berger, Pooling or Participating Mortgages as Investments for Trust Funds
(1929) 48 TRuST Cos. 59_. The present statute permits investment in certain other
obligations when proper mortgages are unavailable. § 1109.2B-3.
29. 3 BOGERT, loc. cit. sapra note 23.
30. Wyman, Investment Considerations (1936) 63 TRUST Cos. 445. As to the fact
that this distinction may not exist under the Pennsylvania statute, see infra p. 596.
31. §§ IIO9.2A and I109.3B.
32. § iio9A.
33. § Iop.IA.
34. § IiO9.2A.
35. §§ ilOpA, iiog.1A, iio9.2A.
36. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Atwood, 78 F. (2d) '92 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; In re
Manayunk Trust Co., No. 2, 21 D. & C. 405 (Pa. C. P. 1934) ; Klein's Estate, 22 D. & C.
490 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1934); Iredell's Estate, 5i Montg. Co. I74 (Pa. Orphans' Ct.
1934).
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from competing with him in any respect.37 One objectionable feature, how-
ever, is the fact that the trustee is permitted to obtain an interest in order
to make distribution, and there is no restriction on the length of time which
it may be held once acquired.38 The statute merely provides that it mray
be resold to another estate of which the trust company is fiduciary. It is
possible that this provision may be construed to permit retention only for
a reasonable length of time. Otherwise the trust company would obviously
be in a position to prefer its own interest therein by enlarging it to its
profit and causing a corresponding decrease in the interests of the bene-
ficiaries.
Another portion of the Banking Code permits a corporate trustee to
be the original purchaser of assets which eventually become the subject of
fiduciary investment, but requires that at the time of acquisition such assets
be earmarked for future trust investment and transferred within one year
thereafter.39 Although such a procedure is contrary to the legal duty of a
trustee not to sell its individual property to the trust estate,40 as a matter
of administrative convenience, such seems to be the practice engaged in by
the average trust company in administering a commingled fund.41 Though
done in the best of faith, it does put the unscrupulous trustee in a position
to dump unfortunate investments on to its trust estates and retain those
producing higher income for itself. Whether the requirement to earmark
will be sufficiently protective to trust estates remains to be seen. The only
other protection afforded is the requisite that all investments be within the
confines of the legal list.42 Even the possibility of surcharge may be of no
restraining influence in this respect, since, in many instances, the prospec-
tive depreciation in the future of certain currently productive securities may
be within the peculiar knowledge of the trustee administering them.
(2) Sale to Public: With respect to transferability, no interest in
the funds may be sold by the trust company on the public market.43 A
custom originally prevailed of creating commingled funds, apportioning in-
terests therein to a number of trust estates, and then selling interests in
the balance to public investors with a guarantee as to the payment of prin-
cipal and interest. 44 The practice has been looked upon with disfavor. 45
One difficulty with the procedure was that it placed the trust company
in the position of seeking out public funds purely for profit and on an
investment business basis. Consequently, there was a tendency in some
37. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928) ; RSTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) § 170, comments a, i and i; Scott, Trustee's Duty of Loyalty (1936)
49 HAxv. L. RLV. 521.
38. §§ iio9A, iiog.iA, 1109.3B.
39. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 7, § 819-1II.
40. Tracey v. Central Trust Co., 327 Pa. 77, 192 Atl. 869 (1937) ; RESTATEmENT,
TRUSTS (1935) § I70, comment i; Scott, supra note 37, at 543-545.
41. Tracey v. Central Trust Co., 3z7 Pa. 77, 192 Atl. 869 (1937) ; Klein's Estate,
22 D. & C. 49o (Pa. Orphans' Ct 1934) ; In re Commercial Trust Co., 36 Dauphin Co.
393 (Pa. C. P. 1933); Barker v. First Nat'l Bank, 2o F. Supp. 185 (N. D. Ala. 1937).
See also Berger, mpra note 28, at 6oo.
42. §§ nIo9A, zIog.iA. More stringent restrictions are set down with respect to
pool-mortgages. § 1I09.2B.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 7, § 819-1o13.
44. For example: In re Commercial Trust Co., 36 Dauphin Co. 393 (Pa. C. P.
1933) ; Werner v. Gordon, 38 Dauphin Co. 8 (Pa. C. P. 1934). See also Note (936)
45 YALE L. J. 857, 859, n. 7. Cf. Manayunk Trust Co., No. 2, 21 D. & C. 405 (Pa. C. P.
1934). Note that the phrase "convertible in cash" does not make the trustee a guaran-
tor. In re Trust of Bailey & Regar, 29 D. & C. 215 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1936).
45. Reichert v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 262 Mich. 123, 247 N. W. 128 (I933);
Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, I95 N. E. 557 (1935).
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instances to overvalue the investments behind the certificates."8 Such was
a fraud both on the public and the estates for which the trust company was
fiduciary. In addition, the practice amounted to something akin to an in-
vestment trust. Although the latter, when properly managed, can be a
socially and economically desirable institution, the first experience in this
country with it has shown it to be pregnable to a number of abuses, chiefly
of a speculative nature,47 and it should not be made a part of the ordinary
trust business.
Another objection is that the guarantees given may ultimately place
the trustee in a position where it is unable to meet full payment thereon,
and, if a number of such guarantees are outstanding, force it into receiver-
ship as in 1933. Consequently, the present statute not only restricts the
issuance of certificates to participating estates, but requires that if issued,
they state that there is no guarantee as to the repayment of principal or
interest, and that such will only be paid when funds become available out
of the particular fund.48  This applies as well to certificates issued to bene-
ficiaries in distribution of their interests in kind.49 That the requirement
is desirable is evident in that it is predicated upon a true trust relationship
rather than that of debtor and creditor.50
(3) Inter Vivos Trusts with Power of Revocation: Closely akin to
the above is the problem with respect to participations by inter vivos trusts
with a power of revocation in the settlor and the right to receive cash upon
termination. There is apparently a fear that if such participations are per-
mitted, the holders thereof will retain their interests only during the periods
of good return, and thus there is a possible danger of something akin to
a run on the account.5 ' It is true that although public participations are
specifically prohibited, there is nothing in the statute to prevent public in-
vestors from investing their funds on a "revocable" trust basis if trust
companies are willing to accept them. As generally conceived, the com-
mon fund type of investment, with its high degree of liquidity, is con-
structed to provide for this type of investment, and to this extent, would
seem somewhat in the nature of an investment trust. Even with its high
degree of liquidity were it able to meet a possible run, such might result
detrimentally to the interests of the remaining participants in that they
might be left with securities less readily able to be liquidated. Although
the fear of "runs" has never materialized,5 2 New York has apparently pro-
46. Pridmore v. Steneck, I2O N. J. Eq. 567, 186 At. 513 (1936) ; Hirsh v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 251 App. Div. 24, 295 N. Y. Supp. 522 (Ist Dep't, 1937).
47. BRADFORD, MONEY AND BANKING (2d ed. 1935) 721-723, contains a concise
description of an investment trust. Some authorities in the trust investment field them-
selves feel that the idea of commingled investment is not to establish an investment
trust business, which would be an addition to the list of services now offered by trust
companies, but merely a method of investment to carry out existing trust services. See
Ward, supra note 3, at 61o. On the other hand, with respect to common funds at least,
see Wyman, supra note 19, at 446, where it is stated that they are "in effect little more
than investment trusts limited to the use of certain of the banks' accounts". In the lat-
ter form of investment, however, a true trust relationship does not exist, the beneficia-
ries being nothing more than shareholders in a corporation. Investments are not legally
restricted, and the trustee's duty of common care and prudence in investment, effectu-
ated by the threat of surcharge, is absent. In addition, creditors of the concern have
priority over the shareholders of the corporation.
48. §§ 1109B, IlO9.IB, 1o9.3A.
49. § II9.3B.
50. For example, see In re Manayunk Trust Co., No. 2, 21 D. & C. 405 (Pa. C. P.
1934).
51. Bogue, supra note I, at 432.
52. Capron, The Federal Reserve Board Regulation of Common Trust Funds
(1938) 5 LAW & CONTEAP. PROD. 439, 447.
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hibited participation in a common fund by trusts of this nature.5 The
Federal Reserve Board has adopted a more liberal attitude, merely requir-
ing that funds invested must be held for "true fiduciary purposes", thus
apparently leaving it to the discretion of the trust company as to whether
the particular investment has been made for speculative purposes.54 The
Pennsylvania statute contains a safeguard in the provisions permitting dis-
tribution in kind, although in the case of mortgage pools cash apparently
must be distributed if available.5 5 With regard to the latter, in order to
prevent a possible run on available cash, apparently trust companies will
be obliged to exercise their discretion in determining whether an invest-
ment is intended as speculative or not. Recent Pennsylvania litigation ihdi-
cates that even in the case of mortgage pools the danger that a settlor of a
revocable trust may follow the market does exist.58 To meet this con-
tingency prior to the statute, the Pennsylvania court held that where depre-
ciation of investments was not the fault of the trustee, distribution in cash
could not be had,"2 and that requirements with respect to the repayment of
"funds" did not necessarily mean "cash" payment.58 The present statute,
however, with regard to common funds and single mortgage or security
participations, would seem to eliminate the necessity in the future of re-
course to these decisions, while with respect to mortgage pools, it actually
prevents recourse by requiring payment in cash, but with certain qualifi-
cations.
Since revocation, even under the statute, may possibly result in preju-
dice to the interest of other trusts in a commingled fund, it might be wise
to refuse to handle funds on such a basis, and advise that they be placed
in a savings account rather than in trust.
(4) Co-Fiduciary Participations: Another problem arises as to
whether funds held by the trust company as co-fiduciary can be commingled
for investment. It is a cardinal principle of trust law that a trustee cannot
properly delegate the power to select investments to an agent or co-trustee.59
The present statute requires that interests in a commingled fund shall be
held solely by the trust company as fiduciary.60 One provision in the mort-
gage pool portion of the statute, however, apparently recognizes the possi-
bility of such participation,6 ' but otherwise, the practice would not seem
to be authorized. That sole management of a fund be in the hands of a
single trustee is obviously essential to the successful operation thereof.
Otherwise it might require weeks for a trustee to notify and obtain consent
from a number of co-trustees for a prospective change in investments, dur-
ing which period a market opportunity will have passed. Certainly it is
no solution to let the co-trustee delegate at his peril. On the other hand,
is it sufficient to say that he properly exercises the discretion required of
him by approving the commingled form of investment and retaining the
53. N. Y. BANKING LAW § io0-c (I).
54. Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F ("Trust Powers of National Banks"), § 17 (a).
55. §§ iiogA, iiog.iA. With respect to mortgage pools, however, see § II09.3C.
See infra p. 595.
56. Roberts's Trust Estate, 316 Pa. 545, 175 At. 869 (i934) ; Osterling v. Com-
monwealth Trust Co., 320 Pa. 67, 181 Atl. 769 (1935).
57. Cricek's Estate, 3,5 Pa. 58i, 173 Ati. 327 (934). Cf. Dempster's Estate, 303
Pa. 153, i62 At1. 447 (932).
58. It re D'Happert's Estate, 2oo At. 927 (Pa. Super. i938).
59. Iscovitz's Estate, 319 Pa. 277, 179 Atl. 548 (1935); RESTATEmENT, TRUsTs
(i935) § i1, comments c and h, and § 194. But cf. Kauffman v. Hiestand, 131 Pa.
Super. 219, 2oo AtI. 251 (938) ; Braun's Estate, 3o D. & C. 575 (Pa. Orphans' Ct.
1937).
6o. §§ igopA, iiog.IA, iiog.2A.
6i. § I109.3B. See infra p. 594.
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right to insist upon withdrawal? It has been suggested that the latter
assumes participation in a fund to be an investment in itself, while actually
it is merely a method of investment. 2 This would not seem to be true
if the co-trustee, in order to exercise his right to force withdrawal, must
keep in touch with the various investments in the fund. It is also argued
that, as a practical matter, individual co-trustees in many instances are
not familiar with the best and most efficient methods of investment pro-
cedure, and are not intended to take an active part therein.63 This may
be true, but whether active or not, and whether corporate or individual,
the law nevertheless places co-trustees under a strict legal duty to see that
the funds of an estate are properly administered,6 and it would seem best,
in the interests of trust estates generally, that the duty be closely adhered to.
It is purely conjectural as to whether, in the normal situation, the
retention of the right to withdraw is sufficient. It would appear rather
impractical to expect a careful check-up by a co-trustee of the many secu-
rities in a mortgage pool or a common fund. On the other hand, in the
case of a single mortgage participation, the problem might be more easily
handled. In the light of the provision heretofore mentioned with respect
to mortgage pools, it seems that the legislature at least anticipated co-
fiduciary participation in that type of fund. If the practice is to be per-
mitted in the other two cases, however, statutory revision would seem
necessary unless participation is to be permitted without the right of with-
drawal. 5
Extent of Single Estate's Capacity to Invest
The usual test applied in order to determine whether an estate should
be placed in the category of a small account is: Is it large enough to permit
the trustee to obtain diversification? 66 Although no arbitrary amount has
been agreed upon, corporate trust authorities feel that such an estate may
run anywhere from $io,ooo to $35,ooo.67 With the exception of accounts
in a few of the larger cities, the size of the average trust apparently falls
within this category.68 Thus a $35,000, or even $25,000, limitation would
permit commingled investment of the large portion of funds held by corpo-
rate trustees. Admittedly, commingled investment is more economical to
the corporate trustee, but since any saving made accrues to it rather than
the trust estate it would seem best, in view of potential dangers to the
interests of estates set forth herein, that commingling be limited strictly to
that point at which separate investment will obtain as great a return to the
estate as it would were it invested with a commingled fund. Although it
may be justifiable to say that small estates should run as large as $35,000
under the test above-mentioned, it would seem that trusts of $ioooo or
62. Ward, supra note 3, at 611.
63. Iredell's Estate, 5, Montg. Co. 174 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1934). See Barclay,
supra note I, at 617.
64. Iscovitz's Estate, 319 Pa. 277, 179 Atl. 548 (1935) ; Klein's Estate, 22 D. & C.
490 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1934) ; 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §§ 555 et seq.,
587. See Tracey v. Central Trust Co., 327 Pa. 77, 8o, 192 Atl. 869, 870 (1937). A co-
trustee cannot complain on his own behalf as a beneficiary, however, after having been
negligent or acquiescent. Rambo's Estate, 327 Pa. 258, 193 Atl. I (1937).
65. New York expressly permits it in the case of the common fund, extending to
the co-trustee the right to compel withdrawal upon written request. N. Y. BANKING
LAw § lOO-c (I) and (S).
66. Ward, supra note 3, at 61o.
67. Ibid.; Stephenson, .mpra note 3, at 9.
68. See supra note 3.
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over could be invested separately and the proper diversification obtained.6
It is also interesting to note that the duty to diversify has apparently not
yet been adopted in Pennsylvania. 70 However, it seems a -wise principle,
and well within the ordinary standard of care imposed upon trustees.
The only restriction in the Pennsylvania statute as to the amount of
funds of any one estate that may be invested appears to be with respect
to investments in mortgage pools.7' Such amount is not to exceed $Iooo
or 2 per cent. of the book-value of the total assets of the pool, whichever
is the larger. The 2 per cent. provision permits the amount to increase in
the case of larger pools.7 2 The restriction would appear to be desirable not
only in preventing monopolization by a few trust estates, but also in pro-
viding for a greater spread of the risk of loss, since, unless the fund is
much smaller than the ordinary mortgage pool,78 the burden of risk will
be borne by at least fifty participants. It would also seem to prevent with-
drawals by any one estate of too large a portion of the pool.
No restriction of this nature is placed upon the common fund or single
mortgage or security type of investment. Although the advantages attach-
ing to the restriction on mortgage pools would seem to have the same
applicability here, the fact that there is no restriction, whether desirable or
not, gives the trustee more leeway in determining which estates will bene-
fit the most by commingled as compared with separate investment. To
escape federal taxation as an association, however, the investment of the
funds of any individual estate in a common fund must not exceed $25,ooo.74
Restrictions on Investments
(i) Common Trust Funds: Under the present statute securities con-
tained in a securities pool must be legal investments,7" meaning that trust
companies seeking to establish such a fund must restrict themselves to
such investments (excluding mortgages which, as previously indicated,
have no place in the common fund) as government bonds and only limited
types of corporate obligations in the public utility field. 76 It is felt that
the existing legal list no longer provides an adequate range of investment
to meet the needs of trust estates. The rapidly increasing influx of funds
into the trust field in the past decade has created a constantly growing
demand for legal securities, thus causing a rise in prices and a correspond-
69. The Minnesota statute restricts such investment to $5ooo. Minn. Laws 1937,
c. 174. On the other hand, the practical objection to such a restriction is that trust
companies may be unwilling, because of the little or no profit involved, to undertake
the administration of estates of this size on a separate investment basis.
7o. Cf. Elldn's Estate, 2o D. & C. 483 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1934). As to this duty
to diversify, see RiSTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 228.
71. § 1109.3A.
72. The larger pools can usually absorb the greater portion of the funds of what
has been denominated a small estate. For example, a pool the assets of which are
worth $25oooo, could receive, under the 2 per cent. provision, $5000 from any one
estate, or one with assets of $r,ooo,ooo could take care of $20, ooo. Any remaining bal-
ances could be invested in a good single mortgage or other legal investment, a common
trust fund, if one is maintained by the trust company, or, since the act permits the
maintenance of one or more, even in another mortgage pool.
73. Rarely are they as small as $5o,ooo. E. g., see Morton, Liquidating One of the
Largest Mortgage Pools in Captivity (1932) 55 TRusT Cos. 695, where a Pittsburgh
bank maintained a mortgage pool worth $5,ooo,ooo.
74. Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F, § 17 (c) (5).
75. § IlogA.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 20, § 8O.
588 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ing decrease in the percentage of return.7 7 In addition, the growing demand
tends to bring about a scarcity of the most active of such securities, i. e.,
those of the larger issues. This would seem to prevent the creation in
Pennsylvania of the type of common fund desired by corporate trustees,
namely, one consisting of a great percentage of readily marketable invest-
ments and which by nature possesses a high degree of liquidity. Conse-
quently, it seems questionable whether funds established under the present
act will be able to meet the liquidity requirements of the Federal Reserve
Board Regulations and thus be immune from taxation.
7
Whether expansion of the legal list to meet this condition would be
desirable, however, is conjectural. Since a common fund contains many
different securities, it is even now impractical, if not impossible, for bene-
ficiaries to investigate them should they so desire. From this viewpoint it
would seem desirable that adequate legal restrictions be retained. In addi-
tion, although partial alleviation of the present condition might be effected,
expansion to the extent desired would necessarily mean opening investment
to an extremely broad field and placing discretion in the trustee as to dis-
crimination between good and bad securities. If this were done, contin-
uous market fluctuations for such types of investment might tend to lend
a speculative influence to trust investment which admittedly is undesirable.
(2) Mortgage Investments: Here also, with respect to single mort-
gage or security participations, investment must be confined to the legal
list.7 9 This seems desirable, since commingled investment in a single obli-
gation, while it does spread the risk of loss over a number of participants,
does not permit diversification.
The requisites concerning mortgage pools, however, have in some
respects been made more rigid. The probable reason is similar to that
suggested above in the case of the common fund, namely, that it is im-
practical for beneficiaries, and here possibly for co-trustees, to investigate
the stability of the many mortgages constituting the pool. Investment is
limited to installment mortgages with stringent restrictions as to renewals,80
limitation as to the maximum value of a single mortgage being placed on
a flexible percentage basis depending upon the size of the pool, but pro-
hibiting any mortgage from exceeding 5 per cent. thereof, or $50,000,
whichever is the lesser.8 1 The installment requirements tend to insure
against a total default of principal, while the restrictions as to size mini-
mize the risk of loss by enabling diversification. In addition, where proper
mortgages are unavailable, investment is permitted in certain government
obligations to the extent of 20 per cent. of the value of the fund, provided
that they be replaced upon proper mortgages becoming available.8 2 Thus
is provided an outlet for otherwise unproductive cash balances and a max-
imum return assured on the total commingled fund. Appraisal of real
estate securing mortgages is required at least once every three years, thus
making the standard of care more definite than that with respect to ordi-
77. Berger, loc. cit. .supra note 28. As a result of these factors, few, if any, securi-
ties pools have been established under the present act, and a movement is now in prog-
ress to stimulate legislation which will give the corporate trustee broader discretion in
the investment of this form of commingled fund.
78. Fed. Res. Bd. Regulation F, § 17 (c) (5). See infra p. 598.
79. § Iog.IA.
8o. § IIO9.2B (i) (a) (3).
81. § iio9.2B (i) (c).
82. § II09.2B (3). All investments must be approved either by the board of di-
rectors of the trust company or a committee appointed thereby including at least two
of its members. § IIOg.2D.
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nary legal mortgages.6 3  Nor is it necessary, apparently, that such appraisal
be made by persons who are strangers to the interests of the company.
8 4
Finally, to provide liquidity, a 5 per cent. cash reserve must be maintained
in addition to cash arising from interest or mortgage installment pay-
ments.85 This, of course, is far below the degree of liquidity felt neces-
sary for a securities pool, but the difference seems justifiable since a mort-
gage pool is by nature restricted to long term investments.
Identification of Interests
(i) Where Funds of Various Estates are Combined: Although the
practice of commingling for investment conflicts with the common-law
principle requiring the ear-marking of trust property, 8 some jurisdictions,
either by way of decision or legislation, have made it an exception to the
rule, apparently feeling that any difficulties pertaining to identification may
be obviated by a requisite that corporate trustees designate clearly upon
their records the names and extent of all estates participating. 7  Such
is the nature of the Pennsylvania statute in this respect.88  Nevertheless,
it is argued that where funds are so combined, a trustee may be subjected
to many conflicting influences in the management thereof. For example,
where certain mortgages go bad, some beneficiaries may desire foreclosure,
others merely an extension of time, and a third group, a complete refinanc-
ing. 9 The same conflict among beneficiaries might also arise in the case
of securities pools. It is felt, apparently, that the trustee must necessarily
favor some interests over others, and, in addition, where it has an interest
of its own in the fund, that it will naturally, even though unconsciously,
tend to favor its own interests.90
With respect to the latter, the Pennsylvania statute provides a partial
answer in that it only authorizes the maintenance of such an interest under
restricted circumstances.f' However, the problem of dealing with con-
flicting interests of estates may still arise in cases involving distribution.
Beneficiaries of such interests are naturally interested in obtaining cash,
even to the detriment of remaining participants, while the latter would
sooner see distribution in kind in order to prevent a devaluation of their
proportionate interests in the fund. The solution to this difficulty would
seem to lie in a requirement that distribution be made ratably, cash dis-
tribution being permitted only to the extent that it does not prejudice the
interests of the remaining participants in the fund. Although no such re-
quirement has been made a part of the Pennsylvania statute, it makes pos-
sible such distribution by permitting it in kind in the cases of securities pools
83. § 1IO9.2E. Apparently only one appraisal is required by statute for the ordinary
legal mortgage, although the usual standard of care might in some cases demand more.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 20, § 8oi-ig (d). No appraisal is required
under § iog.2E, however, of mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administra-
tion under Title II of the National Housing Act, 48 STAT. 1247-1252 (I934), 12 U. S.
C. A. (1936) §§ 1707-1715.
84. In re Harton's Estate, i A. (2d) 292 (Pa. 1938).
85. § IL09.2C.
86. RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 179, comments a and d.
87. See statutes on common trust funds cited supra notes 7 and Io. On com-
mingled investments in mortgages see Springfield Safe Dep. & Trust Co. v. First Uni-
tarian Soc., 2oo N. E. 541 (Mass. 1936) ; N. Y. Laws 1917, c. 385, repealed by N. Y.
Laws 1937, c. 61g, § i.
88. §§ iio9B, I1o9.IB, 1109.3A.
89. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 676, p. 2027.
go. Ibid.
91. §§ 1iog.A, 1xog.1A, 1IO9.3B.
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and single mortgage or security participations. 2 With respect to mort-
gage pools, however, cash distribution is required whenever cash is avail-
able.9 3 Concerning the last, the trustee is apparently prevented from exer-
cising any discretion, and must distribute cash even though it may prove
to the detriment of other participating estates, while in the first two types,
it may exercise its discretion, and is thus placed in a position to favor either
of the conflicting interests. From a practical standpoint, however, there
would seem little reason for a trustee having no interest in the fund other
than as fiduciary to favor one estate over another, since no benefit would
accrue to it by such action.
It might also appear that the duty of a trustee to administer a com-
mingled fund for the equal benefit of all participants conflicts with the duty
to manage each estate solely for its benefit and without subjection to the
influence of other interests.9 4 It is submitted that the trustee actually per-
forms this latter duty by commingling for investment, since by so doing it
minimizes the risk of loss through diversification, and makes the trust
property as productive as is compatible with a high degree of safety.
9 5
(2) Where Mingled with the Assets of the Trustee: An interesting
problem arising in connection with commingled investment is with respect
to the power of the corporate trustee to take title in its individual capacity.
Ordinarily, at common law, a personal trustee is not permitted to mingle
the assets of estates for which he is fiduciary with his own.96 To do so is
a breach of trust, and the beneficiary has the choice of accepting or repudiat-
ing the investment.97 This rule has been extended in its application to
corporate as well as to individual trustees, it being felt that the nature
of the former warrants no preference or privilege.98
As applied to commingled investments, however, distinct administra-
tive advantages can be had by relaxing the principle and permitting title
to be acquired in the corporate capacity. In the case of the common fund,
if title to the securities must be held "as fiduciary" in the sense that they
be publicly recorded as such, salability and delivery are hampered in that
transfer agents will be required to give evidence of their authority to sell.
This causes much delay in bringing about final consummation of a sale,
and stock exchanges, for this reason, refuse to recognize assignments by
trustees as a delivery. 99  The problem is similar with respect to mortgages
held in the same manner where it becomes necessary either to sell or to
foreclose and administer the realty. On the other hand, if title may be
held in a corporate capacity, these administrative difficulties are not pre-
sented, and title can be alienated without the necessity of inquiry by the
purchaser into the trustee's capacity to act. It also facilitates and expe-
dites the procedure of transferring investments between estates by merely
requiring bookkeeping entries rather than the cumbersome method of mak-
ing assignments of record.
Whether these advantages to the corporate trustee warrant a relaxa-
tion of the common-law rule is debatable. In holding the latter applicable
92. §§ iio9A, iio9.iA.
93. § 1lO9.3C.
94. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 170.
95. Id. §§ 181, 228.
96. Id. § 179, comments a and d.
97. Noble's Estate, 178 Pa. 460, 35 Atl. 859 (1896) ; REsTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)
§ 179, comment b. But cf. Graver's Appeal, 50 Pa. 189 (1865).
98. Yost's Estate, 316 Pa. 463, 175 Atl. 383 (1934) ; Quest's Estate, 324 Pa. 23o,
188 At]. 137 (1936).
99. CONSTITUTION AND RULES, PHILA. STOCK EXCH. (as amended, 1932) c. XI,
9 I0.
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to corporate as well as to individual trustees, the same supporting reasons
have been advanced. First, it is feared that such a relaxation will facili-
tate improper substitution of the trustee's own investments for those of its
trust estates in the event of a decrease in the value of the former or increase
in the value of the latter. 0 0 The fact that the records of interests held are
solely within the control of the trustee does leave open the possibility of
alteration thereof, and the existence of such a possibility has been recog-
nized.' 0 ' Thus, the trustee is in complete control of the best, and usually
the only, evidence that a breach of trust may have occurred. Whether
periodical check-ups by the state banking department are frequent enough
to prevent or detect any manipulation or alteration of records is apparently
a debatable question.
0 2
A second reason advanced is that creditors of the trustee might cause
litigation, even though they may not actually acquire rights against the
trust property. 0 3 If the practice of designation merely on the books of
the trust company is recognized as sufficient, however, it would seem that
the rights of beneficiaries could readily be established without causing much
inconvenience on their part. Of course, if sufficient records are not kept,
the hardship falls on the beneficiaries in that only a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship can be established, and they may be forced to share in the assets
of the trust company as general creditors. 04 A similar hardship might
result where the property has been transferred to a bona fide purchaser and
the proceeds cannot be traced. 0 5
The fact that the chances are less that a corporate trustee will take
advantage of its trust estates, 0 6 plus the additional advantages enumerated,
may be sufficient to warrant a relaxation of the principle w-here commingled
investments are involved. However, where funds are commingled under
a single written plan, as is required under Federal Reserve Board Regu-
lations, 07 it would seem that some of the administrative disadvantages of
holding title "as fiduciary" would be eliminated, since the powers of the
trustee to act with respect to the trust property could be readily ascertained.
Usually the privilege has been refused in the absence of appropriate legis-
lative authority. 08 Existing Pennsylvania legislation would seem to per-
mit it so long as trust funds so held are dearly designated on the records of
the trust company1'
IV. MANAGEMENT OF A COMMINGLED FUND
A striking feature of the Pennsylvania statute is the scope of the de-
tailed provisions concerning administration of mortgage pools as compared
with common funds and single security or mortgage participations. As
previously indicated, the probable reason for this was the disastrous ex-
perience in the trust investment field with mortgage investments during
100. 3 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) § 676, p. 2028.
IOI. See Chapter House Circle v. Hartford Nat'l Bank, 121 Conn. 558, 569, 186
AtI. 543, 547 (1936).
102. Ibid. Only one examination per year is required under Pennsylvania law.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 71, § 733-401.
103. 3 BOGERT, Ic. cit. supra note 1oo.
1O4. It re Commercial Trust Co., 36 Dauphin Co. 393 (Pa. C. P. 1933).
105. 3 BOGERT, loc. cit. supra note 10o0.
io6. BRADFORD, MONEY AND BANKING (2d ed. 1935) 702.
107. Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F, § 17 (c) (I).
io8. Chapter House Circle v. Hartford Nat'l Bank, 121 Conn. 558, 186 Atl. 543
(1936) ; Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916).
1o9. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 7, § 819-11o8.
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the recent depression. 110 Since mortgages have always constituted a major
portion of trust investments, however, it seems only natural that this should
have occurred. The reasons for a lack of similarly detailed provisions with
respect to single mortgage participations may be that the administration
of commingled investments of such a nature are more readily subject to
investigation and inquiry. Whether there is any justification for a like
treatment of securities pools must await experience in the management
thereof.
Determination of Income
There are no provisions relating to the determination of income con-
cerning the management of securities pools or single mortgage or security
investments. In the case of mortgage pools, however, the statute requires
that the net income of the fund during the period since the last determina-
tion thereof be determined at least semi-annually." 1  A periodical deter-
mination of income is helpful in providing for a re-allocation in the distri-
bution thereof where participating interests have shifted to different bene-
ficiaries during the interval between determinations. Why a similar provi-
sion is not included with respect to the first two types of investment is not
clear, for it would seem that regular periods for determination of income
are just as essential in all three cases. There is also a noticeable absence
of requirements for valuation of assets."12 On the other hand, there are
obvious administrative advantages to be obtained from a statute which
avoids detailed restrictions with respect to administrative functions. Other
jurisdictions with similar statutes have recognized the fact that flexibility is
important, and have merely enacted enabling statutes, leaving control and
management to the bank or trust company which establishes a fund."83
Reserve Accounts
Here again, the Pennsylvania statute imposes an additional restriction
on mortgage pools which is absent with respect to the other two."x4 In
the management of a mortgage fund, a trust company must maintain a
reserve account equal to io per cent. of the total assets of the fund. When
it falls below this amount, the company must transfer to it out of the net
income of the fund such an amount as its board of directors deem proper
under the circumstances, so long as such amount is not less than .5 per
cent., nor more than i per cent., of the average of the total amounts of all
outstanding participations in the fund at the close of each earning period.
The balance of the net income is then distributed to the participants in
proportion to their respective interests and the periods of the time owned.
The maximum restriction prevents the creation of an unnecessarily large
iio. New York repealed its statute authorizing mortgage participation by cor-
porate trustees shortly thereafter. N. Y. BANKING LAW § io-b (2).
IIn. § liog.4A.
112. See N. Y. BANKING LAW § IaO-c (I0), (II), (12), which makes provision for
this; see also Davis, Liquidating Accounts (1938) 67 TRuST COs. 47, 49.
113. Del. Laws 1935, c. 230; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1934)
§ 71o-164. This is the nature of a proposed Uniform Common Trust Fund Act, the
idea being that in this type of investment the trust company will necessarily follow
Federal Reserve Regulations in order to be immune from federal taxation. Practical
Problems in Common Trust Fund Operations-Uniform Common Trust Find Act
(1938) 67 TRusT Cos. 47, 74. Apparently Professor Bogert advises against a require-
ment in such a statute to abide by the Federal Reserve Board Regulations for fear of its
being declared an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Ibid.
114. § IIO9.4B.
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reserve account at the expense of a decrease in income to the individual
participants, while the minimum requirement assures the estates of a suf-
ficient reserve to meet any unexpected losses or emergencies in the nature of
foreclosure proceedings and immediate administration of the realty. Where
there has been a gain or loss in the sale of a security, it is credited or
debited against the reserve account. 15
Although such a reserve account would not seem necessary in the case
of a common fund because of the much higher percentage of securities it
possesses which can be readily liquidated, it might be of advantage to the
single mortgage or security participation. In the latter case, however, the
trust company might supply the necessary funds from its own accounts
and deduct the same from the fund upon the liquidation thereof. This
would not be likely to place too great a burden on the company's own
funds if the other commingled funds were able to meet such contingencies
from within themselves. However, since it would constitute a loan by
the trustee to its trust estates, should the trustee attempt to collect interest
thereon, it would open itself to a charge of self-dealing.1 16
Real Estate Accounts
When real estate is acquired by a trust company in the management
of a mortgage pool, either by foreclosure or otherwise, the statute requires
that the mortgage which the realty secured be removed from the fund's
mortgage account, and the real estate transferred to a real estate account
created for such purpose1 7 Upon the subsequent sale of the real estate,
the gain or loss, which is the difference between the sale price of the realty
and the value at which it was carried in the real estate account, must be
credited to or charged against the fund's reserve account.
In nature, a real estate account is similar in some respects to what has
been referred to in the case of a common fund as a "liquidating account".
The latter provides a reservoir, in the management of a securities pool, for
any investments in the pool which may become ineligible and not be imme-
diately disposable. Although the present Pennsylvania act makes no pro-
vision for this type of an account, it has been regarded as a necessary ad-
junct to the operation of a common fund elsewhere 11 Ineligible invest-
ments must either be sold or placed therein before any further additions
or withdrawals from the fund are made. In addition, no funds may be
distributed therefrom except on a pro rata basis. Such an account pre-
vents ineligibility of a few investments from placing the continued man-
agement of a common fund at a temporary standstill. Old participants
retain a pro rata interest in the securities placed therein, yet new invest-
ments can be made, and new participants admitted to the pool, since the
latters' interests cannot be prejudiced by those ineligible securities removed
from the fund. Under the Pennsylvania statute, the ineligible investments
apparently must remain in the pool. This prevents the entrance of new
participants, for if admitted, the trust company would be breaching its duty
to that estate by placing its funds in ineligible investments.
The real estate account under the Pennsylvania statute differs from
a liquidating account in that it provides a reservoir for real estate only,
115. § iiog.4E.
i16. Where a fiduciary is undergoing liquidation, such a loan may be ordered by
the court PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 71, § 733-905.
117. § iio9.4D.
118. N. Y. BANKING LAW § 10o-c (7). Cf. Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F,
§17 (c) (6).
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while no provision is made for the removal of ineligible mortgages from
the fund. Of course, in the case of a single mortgage or security partici-
pation, if the investment becomes ineligible, neither a liquidating nor real
estate account would be of any value, since the entire investment will have
been rendered bad. In the latter case, the only solution would be to sell,
if possible, and invest the commingled fund elsewhere.
Power of Substitution
One portion of the Pennsylvania Banking Code, with qualifications,
prohibits the substitution by a corporate fiduciary of its individual property
for that of any of its trust estates."19 An exception is made, however, with
respect to securities pools by permitting a trust company to substitute any
security for one in the pool which is of at least equal value to that for which
it is substitutedY.20  The privilege is not permitted in the case of a single
mortgage or security participation or mortgage pools. That it is granted
to the common fund and not to the mortgage form of investment is probably
because the nature of the former is such that termination of interests therein
are expected to occur more frequently. Consequently, it is an advantage
to be able to substitute securities which can be more easily liquidated.
Nevertheless, the same arguments for and against substitution would seem
to apply to both types.
21
The natural objection is that substitution puts the corporate trustee in
a position which facilitates self-dealing. A predeterminant factor which
strengthens the possibility of the latter's occurrence is the apparent privilege
under the statute of taking title to trust property in the corporate capacity,
and merely designating the fiduciary interests on the records of the trust
company.12 2 Since the two are closely related, it would seem that if there
were justification for permitting title to be taken in the corporate capacity,
then there is justification for extending the power of substitution. Whether
or not the "equal value" provision is a sufficient safeguard can only be
determined through greater experience with the present method of handling
common trust funds.
Transferability and Distribution
(i) Transfers Other than for Distribution: Prior to the instant stat-
ute, interests in commingled funds were in a number of instances freely
transferable. Because of certain disadvantages resulting therefrom, 2 3 the
present act contains stringent restrictions with respect to transferability.
It is permitted, with one exception, only in cases involving distribution, and
then merely between estates of which the trust company is fiduciary or
between such estates and the trust company's commercial department.' 2
The exception is made in the case of mortgage pools, and is itself re-
stricted to transfers between estates of which the trust company is acting
as co-fiduciary. 12 By confining it to such estates, the danger that one
X19. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 7, § 81g-iii.
120. § Io9C.
121. The unfortunate experience with the substitutionary type of participation mort-
gage certificates illustrates the evils which arise from substitution. See Note (1934)
34 COL. L. REv. 663, 683, n. 8o.
122. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 7, § 819-iio8; 3 BOoaER, TRuSTS
AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 676, p. 2028. See supra p. 591.
123. See supra p. 583.
124. §§ iiogA, Iiog.iA, I109.3B.
125. § I109.33B.
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trust might be favored over another is eliminated. More important, per-
haps, is the fact that co-fiduciaries who have consented to participation in
such a fund are thereby more easily enabled to exercise a right of with-
drawal should investments not meet with their approval.
That the provision is not made applicable to common funds would
seem to indicate that the legislature may not have intended co-fiduciary
estates to participate in this form of commingled investment. 126 Although
withdrawal could still be accomplished by sale of an estate's proportionate
interest, it might quite likely prejudice the interests of other participants
therein. In addition, were this permitted, a co-trustee might well make
use of a securities pool purely for speculative purposes. However, with
respect to transfers, since the trust company is not required to maneuver
them, and since from the point of view of a transferee estate there is
theoretically an ever-watchful co-trustee keeping guard over its interests,
to take advantage of another co-fiduciary estate in this manner would seem
almost impossible. An additional reason may be that since changes in
investments are likely to be much more frequent in the case of a securities
pool, there is the possibility that the trust company might be subjected to
continuous hampering by co-trustees with respect to such changes. In any
event, denial of this privilege to commingled investments other than mort-
gage pools would seem to indicate that investment by co-fiduciary estates
in common funds and single security participations was not anticipated.
(2) Transfers in Aid of Distribution: To accomplish distribution,
the statute permits, with respect to common funds and single mortgage
or security participations, the transfer of interests between estates of which
the trust company is fiduciary. 2 7 In all three types of investment, transfers
for the same purpose are permitted between estates and the commercial de-
partment of the trust company, which may in turn resell to another estate of
which it is the fiduciary.' 28  Denial of the first privilege to mortgage pools
seems to have been either an oversight or an arbitrary legislative discrimina-
tion. This provision also would seem to insure against the favoring of
the interests of one estate over another should the trustee be tempted to
do so because of speculative opportunities on the market. In addition, the
fact that transfers made to the commercial department are permitted only
to effect distribution is, in a sense, a restriction on a trust company's main-
taining an equity in the pool.
(3) Transfers in Distribution: Interests in either a securities pool
or single mortgage or security participation may be transferred to any
beneficiary in distribution. 29 Thus it is left in the discretion of the trust
company to refuse cash distribution should it feel that it might prejudice
the interests of other participants in the pool. It also prevents settlors
with a power of revocation from embarrassing the trust company during
the period of a falling market or at any time when sufficient cash is not
available. This was one difficulty encountered before the enactment of the
present statute with respect to mortgage pools. 80
In the case of mortgage pools, however, beneficiaries are entitled to
cash distribution of both principal and income if cash is available.' 8 ' Such
126. See supra p. 586.
127. §§ II09A, iiog.iA.
128. Ibid. and § 1109.3B.
129. §§ xiogA, iio9.1A.
13o. Cricek's Estate, 315 Pa. 581, 173 Atl. 327 (1934) ; Roberts's Trust Estate, 316
Pa. 54, 175 Atl. 869 (1934) ; Kefover v. Potter Title and Trust Co., 320 Pa. 51, 18,
Atl. 771 (1935) ; Osterling v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 320 Pa. 67, 18I Atl. 769 (1935).
131. § 1109.3C.
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income is only payable after the amount thereof has been determined at the
next accounting date. If cash is not available, the trustee is permitted
to distribute "withdrawal certificates" to the amount of any participation
not paid in cash. Such certificates are payable as soon as cash becomes
available, and until redeemed the holders are entitled to income thereon.
That cash shall be distributed would seem to be mandatory on the trust
company. Although the provision saves it from embarrassment when cash
is unavailable, to require payment thereof when available may very possibly
prejudice the interests of the remaining participants. This might occur, for
example, if certain salable mortgages were disposed of in order to obtain
sufficient cash to pay off the beneficiaries of a terminated trust, while the
pool were left with other mortgages not so marketable. Thus, the remain-
ing participants might suffer a corresponding depreciation in the value of
their proportionate interests, while the terminated estate would reap the
benefit of the marketable mortgages. For this reason, it would seem that a
provision permitting ratable distribution of both cash and kind in such in-
stances would provide a better solution to the problem. The instant pro-
vision does contain a requirement somewhat in line with this idea, but
applicable only where a mortgage fund has been closed while withdrawal
certificates are outstanding. It provides that the holders of such certificates
shall receive no preferences, but must share proportionately with the other
participants in the pool. If ratable distribution is applied in the latter case,
it seems arbitrary that it should not be applied where cash is available.
So long as withdrawal certificates are outstanding in a mortgage pool,
no further investments can be made nor can any new participants be ad-
mitted.182 This seems to be a sensible restriction, but why it has not been
extended to other forms of commingled investment, where the need seems
just as great, is not quite clear. Additional problems arise concerning
delayed distributions of trusts, rights of successive beneficiaries, and amor-
tization of bond premiums. No solution seems to be afforded by the instant
statute.1 88
Finally the act apparently eliminates what has previously been indi-
cated as a distinguishing feature between the common fund and the mort-
gage pool, the former by nature expanding and contracting with additions
and withdrawals, the latter remaining constant.'84 Under the instant stat-
ute, transferability, with the exception of transfers between co-fiduciary
estates of interests in a mortgage pool, is restricted exclusively to distribu-
tion. Therefore expansion and contraction would seem as necessary to the
mortgage pool as to the common fund in order to meet withdrawals by
existing, as distinguished from terminated, trusts. However, since with-
drawals occur most frequently in cases involving distribution, if participa-
tion by trusts with a power of revocation is restricted there seems to be
less necessity for frequent expansion and contraction of even a common
fund, and therefore less necessity for a high degree of liquidity therein.
Consequently, more stable securities could be carried in the common fund,
and the danger of speculative influences affecting its investments would be
decreased.
V. LIQUIDATION OF COMMINGLED FUNDS
There are somewhat detailed provisions concerning the liquidation of
mortgage pools, but none whatever with regard to the liquidation of com-
132. Ibid.
133. For a discussion of these questions see Ward, Problenms in the Administration
of Common Trust Funds (1938) 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 453.
134. See spra p. 582.
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mon funds or single security or mortgage participations. A possible reason
for this discrimination may be that liquidation of a mortgage pool may
involve a more complicated procedure where realty is included in its real
estate account, or foreclosure and further administration of real estate is
necessary to liquidate the individual investments in the pool. Nevertheless,
it would seem that some of the standards adopted might well have been
made applicable to other commingled forms of investment.
The act provides that a mortgage pool may be closed at any time by
resolution of the board of directors,1 -5 but must be closed where (i) the
sum total of certain items listed exceeds the reserve account by more than
1O per cent.,18 or (2) where the total amount of unpaid principal of all
mortgages in the fund upon which any amortizations remain unpaid for six
months after the due date exceeds 20 per cent. of the total value of the
assets of the fund.1 7  Once closed, no further investments are permitted,
and the trustee must petition the court to authorize liquidation thereof .1
8
Where liquidation is authorized, net income may still be collected and dis-
tributed until sufficient funds have accrued to pay off the entire principal
indebtedness. 89 Distribution of principal shall be made as of the date
when the fund was dosed, and income distributed in proportion to the
particular interests and length of time owned, while any funds remaining
after full payment are to be regarded as principal and distributed as such. 40
These requisites are only applicable to mortgage funds created after the
effective date of the act. 41
Where a mortgage fund has been closed either before or after the
effective date of the act, the trust company, or any party in interest, in
the event of emergency or necessity, may petition the court to direct the
payment of all or any part of a participation in advance or on other than
a pro rata basis. 14 2  At first glance, this provision may seem to lay other
interests in the pool open to possible prejudice in recovering their interest
in the fund. However, since it is left to the discretion of the court as to
how such a petition may be handled, it is doubtful that other interests will
be adversely affected. Who is a party in interest will depend on judicial
interpretation of the provision. 4
'35. § IIO9.5A.
136. § iiog.5B (i).
137. § iiog.5B (2). This is qualified by allowing the trust company to suspend
amortization payments under certain conditions for two years and not include such mort-
gages in the calculation of this item.
138. § Io9.5C.
I39. Ibid.
i4o. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
I42. § uog.5D.
143. Although not covered by the instant statute, interesting problems also arise in
connection with liquidation of the fiduciary of commingled investments. For statutory
provisions with respect thereto see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 71,
§§ 733-901 to 905. If necessary, the court may order the Secretary of Bahldng to
transfer cash from the general assets of the trustee to the commingled fund, which cash
is to be repaid thereafter from the first income of the fund. Yd. § 733-905. Where a
trust relationship cannot be established because of insufficient records, interest-holders
may share only as general creditors. it re Commercial Trust Co., 36 Dauphin Co. 393
(Pa. C. P. 1933). Whether a trustee would be permitted to share proportionately as a
participant in the assets of a commingled fund as it formerly could [Commonwealth
Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Atwood, 78 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 3d, i935)] is doubtful, in
view of the apparent restrictions on the maintenance of an interest by the fiduciary under
the present statute.
As to the right of mortgagors to set off their deposits against their debts to a pool,
see U. S. Bank & Trust Co. Case, 311 Pa. 320, I66 Atl. 871 (1933); Commonwealth
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VI. TAXATION
(I) Federal: The Federal Revenue Act of 1936 excepts commingled
forms of investment by fiduciaries from taxation so long as they comply
with the regulations of the Federal Reserve Board,144 and the latter body
has since established general requirements for this method of investment.145
These requirements, however, only provide for the common fund type of
investment.
With respect to this form of investment, most differences between the
Pennsylvania statute and the federal regulations consist of the absence in
the former of certain requirements of the latter. In these instances the
Pennsylvania act does not prevent a common fund from being established
in accordance with the Board's provisions. Some of the additional federal
requirements not in the Pennsylvania statute are: requirement of a written
plan of operation, periodical valuation of assets, restrictions against dis-
tribution, and restrictions as to the size of an estate's participation.146 One
important difference, however, is the requirement of the Board that a 4o
per cent. degree of liquidity be maintained.147 Under the present Penn-
sylvania statute, which restricts investments to legals, it is doubtful whether
there can be compliance with this provision.
Apparently the same difficulty exists with regard to commingled mort-
gage investments, and the Pennsylvania Mortgage Investment Fund Com-
mittee has been working with the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System to evolve federal regulation which will be in compliance with
the Pennsylvania statute.
48
(2) State and Local: Although there is no provision in the present
act exempting commingled investments from taxation, 4 it is doubtful
whether they will be taxed under existing Pennsylvania tax laws. For tax
purposes they do not fall within any of the definitions of a corporation. 50
Consequently, there would seem to be no danger of subjection to a cor-
porate income or franchise tax. In addition, partnerships are not taxable
as an entity so far as income is concerned.5 There is the possibility, how-
ever, that the interests held by the individual trusts might be subjected to
a personal property tax.
CONCLUSION
That the present Pennsylvania legislation concerning commingled in-
vestment is essential to the further expansion of trust investment is no
longer questioned. The desirability of such expansion, however, from a
legal viewpoint must await the test of future developments. Though com-
mingled investment seems similar in some respects to investment trusts,
particularly in the case of common funds, the higher legal standard of care
and responsibility required of fiduciaries imposes a restraining influence on
Trust Co. of Pittsburgh's Appeal, 324 Pa. 16r, 188 Atl. 200 (1936) ; Werner v. Gordon,
38 Dauphin Co. 8 (Pa. C. P. 1934). Where such a right has been created by contract,
see Kisinger v. Pennsylvania Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, xig Pa. Super. 16, iso Atl. 79
(i935) ; cf. Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 Ohio St. 323, 195 N. E. 557 (1935) ; Gordon v. An-
thracite Trust Co., 117 Pa. Super. 544, 178 Atl. 406 (1935).
144. 49 STAT. 1708, 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1938) § i69.
145. Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F ("Trust Powers of National Banks") § 17.
146. See respectively id. § I7c (I), (4), (7) and (5).
147. Id. § I7c (5).
148. Berger, Mortgage Pools (1938) 66 TRUST Cos. 739.
149. New York exempts common funds from taxation, N. Y. TAx LAW § 365-a, as
amended N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 570.
15o. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 72, §§ 3324, 3402-2, 342ob.
151. Id. § 3402-203.
